With answers only come more questions
Air India inspected the fuel control switches of their other aircraft and all were found to be working as prescribed. Yet, that does not necessarily mean that 171 were also working. It also does not say they were not. Still unknown.
“US Officials” have said “The Captain pulled the fuel control to cutoff.”
My question is, “Who are these US officials?” Why would US officials have more information than India officials, based upon one pilot stating to the other pilot that he had pulled the fuel control to off, and the pilot accused stating he did not. Did he pull the switches or not? We may never know. Speculation says yes. But once again, people don’t like speculation. Are they interviewing the family, medical history, and motivation for such an action? Where are those reports?
While the Boeing 787 flight data recorders (FDRs) are capable of recording pilot control inputs, they do not show who was the manipulator of the controls. Perhaps this should be addressed for future production. Did the First Officer raise the fuel control switches and fly at the same time? Did the captain cut off the fuel and then he took control of the plane and held the nose up trying to stall, knowing that the first officer’s efforts to relight were for not? Did the captain have a moment and realize he did not want to die and tried to start them and the first officer did not understand that he needed to put the nose forward to sustain flight? We will never know. But I don’t believe we should allow this event, or any the previous crashes should be without some purpose. There is always something we can learn.
Technology is Fallible
What we do know, is technology is fallible. There is also that old saying, “If a pilot can screw something up, he will.”
DELTA B717 Dual Engine Failure at Altitude
Back in 2014, a Delta B717 crew was at altitude and set their Surface (similar to an Ipad) on the center pedestal resting against the throttles. When they began their descent, the autothrottles directed the thrust levers to move to idle. When the thrust levers moved back, they pushed the Surface against the fuel control shutoff switches, pushing them both to off. This caused a dual engine failure. While the pilots restarted the engines due to their altitude, Delta kept this quite from the media.
Shortly thereafter Delta sent out a memo regarding “placement” of the EFBs (Electronic Flight Bag) in the cockpit, and to be careful when placing them on the center pedestal. Then they created a fix with producing a guard. See below
While this was kept quiet from the public and thus pilots at other airlines, I believe we can always learn from everything that transpires. A pilot recently wrote, “What I see is happening is the Pilots generally are overeliant in automation to the extent that the principle rule that YOU profess of fly is missing.”
What Every Pilot Should Know
V1 is the speed pilots make the decision to abort. Pilots, if you lose two engines abort!
VR is the rotation speed. The speed pilots rotate and lift the plane off the ground. Pilots if you lose two engines on rotation, put the nose down and abort the takeoff. You will hit whatever is at the end of the runway, but this is your best option for survival.
V2 is the takeoff safety speed that will enable a plane to climb with one engine to 35 feet. Pilots, if you lose two engines at V2 push the nose forward and find the best place to put it in. You will not fly. You will crash. But do so upright.
200 feet in the air, Pilots if you lose two engines you will not fly. Push the nose forward and attempt to glide to the best location.
400 feet in the air, Pilots if you lose two engines, you will not fly. Push the nose forward and attempt to glide to the best location.
Etc. Etc. Etc.
Take Control of the Mass
Will people die? Will you hit something without engine power? More than likely yes, depending upon what is in front of you. Will you survive? Maybe. But would it not be better to do everything you can? I was in the simulator with a captain once who was new to the A330. We had an electrical failure that wiped out everything and then the plane started reconfiguring itself and some instruments came back to life. He rotated, this electrical event occurred and he yelled, “You have the plane” and threw his hands up. Now the Airbus is very stable. He did a great rotation so no adjustment on my part was necessary. Why the panic if he understood the stability? That’s the problem. Training doesn’t address this. He did not understand the plane.
I remember a pilot instructor once said, “Planes are inherently stable, it’s the pilot that makes them unstable.”
Back to the pilot who said we are over-reliant upon automation. Why would pilots not have such a reliance if they show up to airline training without experience and all the airline teaches is how to push buttons? It’s not possible to do anything less than to rely upon the only thing they know. We blame startle effect. But startle effect can be diminished by training and experience. The A330 captain startled. I understood the plane and thus did not.
Michelle Huntington and the experiences she shared in her memoir Lady MacGyver explains this concept. A young pilot building flight hours who took the time to fly a different route every trip for the purpose of getting familiar with surroundings. She paid attention to distance, time, and geography. Thus, when her plane was struck by lightning and she lost her instruments and communication in solid IFR at night, she did not panic. Due to her effort to learn, pay attention and think, she was able to fly to safety. No panic, just decisive action.
I can only hope someone in the aviation industry will understand that training must be improved at the airline level, because these new pilots don’t have experience to meet the current training. If not, we will see more accidents.
4 Comments
It’s become a matter of national pride for India that this is not a matter of pilot suicide, although pilot suicide has occurred across a spectrum of countries and cultures.
Low time pilots can probably fly piston trainers without automation, but never learn to fly jets without automation. But all transport category jets are very similar and pitch and N1 settings to fly one will be very close for every other.
Well… between the Airbus and Boeing those two companies are making an effort to create opposing terms and systems. Even navigation, Boeing goes to a point and the Airbus from a point. And when you say fly…do you mean fly or program the automation? They tried to standardize the fleets when NWA and Delta merged. I think the problems began when they decided that the airbus had a stick shaker because the Boeing did and rewrote the manuals. I digress. Standardization between fleets that are not standard is the beginning of the problem especially when those who have not a clue are writing the manuals.
During World Airline Training Summit last year, pilots made an empassioned plea to be allowed more hands-on flying. They reckoned they were too dependent on automation and would not be in complete command if automation failed. They especially wanted to hand fly at the most critical times. BUT, they said airlines didn’t allow them to do it because automation was more reliable which is quite an indictment of training.
There is a global movement toward pilot training reform and even those who promulgated the 1500-hour rule in the US want it changed to CBTA.
I wrote a two parter on this after this year’s WATS. What made me curious during this year’s summit was no mention of increased hand flying. It made sense to me but I’m not a pilot. I just cover training. Here are my stories on what changes would look like. After nearly a decade covering WATS I can say I definitely get it. Kathryn Creedy
https://futureaviationaerospaceworkforce.com/2025/04/21/analysis-overhauling-aviation-training-the-global-push-for-new-standards/
Thank you for your efforts Kathryn!! Pilots once upon a time brought those skills to the airline. The airlines only had to train for the particular airplane. Today they do not bring those skills, and the airlines still only train the specific airplane. If you read Normalization of Deviance a Threat to Aviation safety, you’ll see that some airlines tell the pilots that upset will occur if they disengage the automation. Another airline find an Expat for disengaging the autopilot on short final. Automation is only good until it breaks. Thank you for sharing this link!